

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 AEC-11 IO-14 OMB-01

DRC-01 /159 W

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R 131745Z FEB 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4050

SECDEF

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY OLSO

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T USNATO 0778

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: SPC CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REEF: USNATO 721

SUMMARY: IN SPC FEB 11 DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY, MOST REPS
GENERALLY RECAPITULATED KNOW POSITIONS. BASIC PROBLEM CONFRONTING
ALLIES, THEY CONCLUDED, WAS HOW TO ACHIEVE AIM OF FLANK SECURITY
WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY AN UNACCEPTABLE PRICE. UK REP MADE STRONG
STATEMENT INDICATING PARA 30 MEASURES WERE INADMISSIBLE AS
NEGOTIATING INSTRUMENTS. ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT MEASURE 3 IN
PARA 30 (PROVISIONS TO PREVENT REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWN
FORCES TO WESTERN USSR AND NSWP COUNTRIES) MIGHT BE SOLUTION TO
SECRET

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ALLIED PROBLEM. SPC RETURNS TO SUBJECT FEB 18. END SUMMARY

1. TURKISH REP (TULUMEN) EXPRESSED CONTINUING DOUBTS ABOUT U.S.
PROPOSALS. HE ASKED HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE

CONTENT OF AN AGREEMENT PROVISION AS WELL AS ANY STATEMENTS TO BE MADE IN VIENNA WITHOUT FIRST HAVING STUDIED PARA 30 MEASURES INDIVIDUALLY. HE HOPED U.S. WOULD PROVIDE COMMENTARY ON ALL PARA 30 MEASURES AND WOULD ALSO INDICATE THE FORM AND CONTENT OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT PROVISION.

2. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT (PER STATE 25375) WASHINGTON HAD AGREED TO PROVIDE A FORMULATION ON FLANK SECURITY WHICH HE EXPECTED WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. HE ALSO SAID THAT WASHINGTON COULD AGREE WITH TURKISH PROPOSAL TO HAVE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT MAKE THE FIRST STATEMENT ON FLANK SECURITY ISSUE IN VIENNA.

3. UK REP (LOGAN) MADE STRONG STATEMENT THAT PARA 30 MEASURES ARE BASICALLY INADMISSIBLE AS NEOGITIATING INSTRUMENTS. EITHER THE SOVIETS WILL REJECT THEM AS NOT RELEVANT TO THE AREA CONCERNED WITH MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, OR THEY WILL AGREE TO DISCUSS THEM ONLY

ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. ALLIES CAN LOGICALLY EXPECT NO OTHER SOVIET REACTION. FLANKS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IF ALLIED WERE TO PURSUE A DISBANDMENT PROPOSAL (WHICH THE UK HAD EARLIER FAVORED), THEY COULD IN SO DOING CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THOSE ALLIES- ESPECIALLY THE U.S.-WHOSE DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES EMBRACE THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IF FLANK COUNTRIES AGREE THAT THE INDIVISIBILITY OF ALLIANCE SECURITY MUST BE A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MBFR, THEY MUST THEN TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH ANY OF THEIR PROPOSALS WILL HAVE FOR THOSE ALLIES WHO MUST IMPLEMENT A STRATEGY ON WHICH THE SECURITY OF ALL IS DEPENDENT. FROM ITS OWN NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS, THE UK WOULD NOT WISH TO BE FORCED TO DISBAND WITHDRAWN FORCES, AND ASSUMED THE SAME APPLIED TO THE U.S.

4. ITALIAN REP (SPINELLI) AGREED THAT KEY PROBLEM IS RECIPROCITY. ALLIES SHOULD NOT PROPOSE ANYTHING WHICH THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT- AS AN ALLIANCE-ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. EMPHASIS ON MEASURE 3 IN PARA 30 MIGHT THEREFORE BE A WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM, BUT ALLIES SHOULD REFLECT FURTHER ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

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5. MC REP (SMITH) MADE HELPFUL STATEMENT THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS WILL NOT APPRECIABLY DEGRADE THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER WITHDRAWN FORCES ARE DISBANDED, PLACED IN RESERVE OR REDEPLOYED FAR FROM NGA. FOR ALLIES, HOWEVER, ANY RECIPROCAL REQUIREMENT TO DISBAND OR PLACE IN RESERVE WITHDRAWN FORCES WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE THEIR ABILITY TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO GDP POSITIONS.

6. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) SAID THAT DISBANDMENT IDEA WAS BASICALLY DANGEROUS AND THAT DISBANDMENT OF ALLIED FORCES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.

7. CANADIAN AND BELGIAN REPS FELT THAT A GENERAL STATEMENT IN VIENNA ON FLANK SECURITY WOULD BE SUFFICIENT AT THIS TIME, WITH

CANADA NOTING THAT SUCH A STATEMENT COULD PRODUCE REACTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS. SUCH REACTIONS COULD HELP ALLIES DETERMINE WHETHER THEY SHOULD TAKE UP PARA 30 MEASURES AGAIN OR CONSIDER OTHER WAYS TO RESOLVE FLANK CONCERNS.

8. DISCUSSION ENDED ON GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT SPC WOULD CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR WAYS THAT WOULD TAKE FLANK SECURITY INTO ACCOUNT BUT WOULD ALSO EXPLORE IN PARALLEL FEASIBILITY OF U.S. PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING.

9. COMMENT. WE THINK DOCUMENT PROPOSED IN REFTTEL WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF IT WORKED OUT IN SOME DETAIL POSSIBLE AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF RECIPROCITY ON THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL DEFENSE CAPABILITY. ITALIAN FOCUS ON MEASURE 3 OF PARA 30 IS A NEW DEVELOPMENT. END COMMENT MCAULIFFE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO00778
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740267/abbrytfq.tel
Line Count: 125
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <26-Jul-2001 by maustmc, RDFRD>; RELEASED <01 MAY 2002 by golinofr>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: SPC CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ANKARA
ATHENS
OLSO
ROME
BONN
LONDON

VIENNA

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005